Recent studies in social endocrinology have explored the effects of social relationships on female reproductive steroid hormones—estradiol and progesterone—investigating whether they are suppressed in partnered and parous women. Results have been mixed for these hormones although evidence is more consistent that partnered women and women with young children have lower levels of testosterone. These studies were sequential to earlier research on men, based on Wingfield’s Challenge Hypothesis, which showed that men in committed relationships, or with young children, have lower levels (...) of testosterone than unpartnered men or men with older or no children. The study described here explored associations between estradiol and progesterone with partnership and parity among women from two different ethnicities: South Asian and white British. We hypothesized that both steroid hormones would be lower among partnered and/or parous women with children ≤3 years old, regardless of ethnicity. In this study we analyzed data from 320 Bangladeshi and British women of European origin aged 18 to 50 who participated in two previous studies of reproductive ecology and health. Levels of estradiol and progesterone were assayed using saliva and/or serum samples and the body mass index calculated from anthropometric data. Questionnaires provided other covariates. Multiple linear regressions were used to analyze the data. The hypotheses were not supported. We argue here that, unlike links between testosterone and male social relationships, theoretical foundations for such relationships with female reproductive steroid hormones are lacking, especially given the primary role of these steroids in regulating female reproductive function. Further longitudinal studies are needed to explore the bases of independent relationships between social factors and female reproductive steroid hormones. (shrink)

Creationists have acquired a more sophisticated intellectual arsenal. This book reveals the insubstantiality of their arguments. Creationism is no longer the simple notion it once was taken to be. Its new advocates have become more sophisticated in how they present their views, speaking of "intelligent design" rather than "creation science" and aiming their arguments against the naturalistic philosophical method that underlies science, proposing to replace it with a "theistic science." The creationism controversy is not just about the status of Darwinian (...) evolution—it is a clash of religious and philosophical worldviews, for a common underlying fear among Creationists is that evolution undermines both the basis of morality as they understand it and the possibility of purpose in life. In Tower of Babel, philosopher Robert T. Pennock compares the views of the new creationists with those of the old and reveals the insubstantiality of their arguments. One of Pennock's major innovations is to turn from biological evolution to the less charged subject of linguistic evolution, which has strong theoretical parallels with biological evolution, both in content and in the sort of evidence scientists use to draw conclusions about origins. Of course, an evolutionary view of language does conflict with the Bible, which says that God created the variety of languages at one time as punishment for the Tower of Babel. Several chapters deal with the work of Phillip Johnson, a highly influential leader of the new Creationists. Against his and other views, Pennock explains how science uses naturalism and discusses the relationship between factual and moral issues in the creationism-evolution controversy. The book also includes a discussion of Darwin's own shift from creationist to evolutionist and an extended argument for keeping private religious beliefs separate from public scientific knowledge. (shrink)

In the 2005 Kitzmiller v Dover Area School Board case, a federal district court ruled that Intelligent Design creationism was not science, but a disguised religious view and that teaching it in public schools is unconstitutional. But creationists contend that it is illegitimate to distinguish science and religion, citing philosophers Quinn and especially Laudan, who had criticized a similar ruling in the 1981 McLean v. Arkansas creation-science case on the grounds that no necessary and sufficient demarcation criterion was possible and (...) that demarcation was a dead pseudo-problem. This article discusses problems with those conclusions and their application to the quite different reasoning between these two cases. Laudan focused too narrowly on the problem of demarcation as Popper defined it. Distinguishing science from religion was and remains an important conceptual issue with significant practical import, and philosophers who say there is no difference have lost touch with reality in a profound and perverse way. The Kitzmiller case did not rely on a strict demarcation criterion, but appealed only to a “ballpark” demarcation that identifies methodological naturalism (MN) as a “ground rule” of science. MN is shown to be a distinguishing feature of science both in explicit statements from scientific organizations and in actual practice. There is good reason to think that MN is shared as a tacit assumption among philosophers who emphasize other demarcation criteria and even by Laudan himself. (shrink)

Preface 9 PART I: RELIGIOUS, SCIENTIFIC, AND PHILOSOPHICAL BACKGROUND Introduction to Part I 19 1. The Bible 27 2. Natural Theology 33 William Paley 3. On the Origin of Species 38 Charles Darwin 4. Objections to Mr. Darwin’s Theory of the Origin of Species 65 Adam Sedgwick 5. The Origin of Species 73 Thomas H. Huxley 6. What Is Darwinism? 82 Charles Hodge 7. Darwinism as a Metaphysical Research Program 105 Karl Popper 8. Karl Popper’s Philosophy of Biology 116 Michael (...) Ruse 9. Human Nature: One Evolutionist’s View 136 Francisco Ayala 10. Universal Darwinism 158 Richard Dawkins PART II: CREATION SCIENCE AND THE McLEAN CASE Introduction to Part II 187 11. The Creationists 192 Ronald L. Numbers 12. Creation, Evolution, and the Historical Evidence 231 Duane T. Gish 13. Witness Testimony Sheet: McLean v. Arkansas Board of Education 253 Michael Ruse 14. United States District Court Opinion: McLean v. Arkansas Board of Education 279 Judge William R. Overton 15. The Demise of the Demarcation Problem 312 Larry Laudan 16. Science at the BarùCauses for Concern 331 Larry Laudan 17. Pro Judice 337 Michael Ruse 18. More on Creationism 345 Larry Laudan 19. Commentary: Philosophers at the BarùSome Reasons for Restraint 350 Barry R. Gross PART III: INTELLIGENT DESIGN CREATIONISM AND THE KITZMILLER CASE Introduction to Part III 369 20. But Isn’t It Creationism? The Beginnings of "Intelligent Design" in the Midst of the Arkansas and Louisiana Litigation 377 Nick Matzke 21. What Is Darwinism? 414 Phillip E. Johnson 22. Is It Science Yet? Intelligent Design, Creationism, and the Constitution 426 Matthew Brauer, Barbara Forrest, and Steven G. Gey 23. Kitzmiller v. Dover Area School District Expert Witness Testimony 434 Michael Behe 24. Kitzmiller v. Dover Area School District Expert Report 456 Robert T. Pennock 25. A Step toward the Legalization of Science Studies 485 Steve Fuller 26. What Is Wrong with Intelligent Design? 495 Elliott Sober 27. United States District Court Memorandum Opinion: Kitzmiller, et al. v. Dover Area School District, et al. 506 Judge John E. Jones II 28. Can’t Philosophers Tell the Difference between Science and Religion? Demarcation Revisited 536 Robert T. Pennock. (shrink)

In the 2005 Kitzmiller v Dover Area School Board case, a federal district court ruled that Intelligent Design creationism was not science, but a disguised religious view and that teaching it in public schools is unconstitutional. But creationists contend that it is illegitimate to distinguish science and religion, citing philosophers Quinn and especially Laudan, who had criticized a similar ruling in the 1981 McLean v. Arkansas creation-science case on the grounds that no necessary and sufficient demarcation criterion was possible and (...) that demarcation was a dead pseudo-problem. This article discusses problems with those conclusions and their application to the quite different reasoning between these two cases. Laudan focused too narrowly on the problem of demarcation as Popper defined it. Distinguishing science from religion was and remains an important conceptual issue with significant practical import, and philosophers who say there is no difference have lost touch with reality in a profound and perverse way. The Kitzmiller case did not rely on a strict demarcation criterion, but appealed only to a “ballpark” demarcation that identifies methodological naturalism as a “ground rule” of science. MN is shown to be a distinguishing feature of science both in explicit statements from scientific organizations and in actual practice. There is good reason to think that MN is shared as a tacit assumption among philosophers who emphasize other demarcation criteria and even by Laudan himself. (shrink)

This book presents Cicero's natural law theory, including valuable definitions of the state, the ideal state, the ideal ruler, and the laws for the ideal state. Explanations are offered of the Greek sources of Cicero's republican philosophy, his influence on the Principate of Augustus, and his role in the development of modern political philosophy. As all the ages of the world have not produced a greater statesman and philosopher united than Cicero, his authority should have great weight (John Adams, 1787).

An anthology of writings by proponents and critics of intelligent design creationism.

Responsible conduct of research training typically includes only a subset of the issues that ought to be included in science ethics and sometimes makes ethics appear to be a set of externally imposed rules rather than something intrinsic to scientific practice. A new approach to science ethics training based upon Pennock’s notion of the scientific virtues may help avoid such problems. This paper motivates and describes three implementations—theory-centered, exemplar-centered, and concept-centered—that we have developed in courses and workshops to introduce students (...) to this scientific virtue-based approach. (shrink)

According to J. L. Schellenberg’s argument from the reasonableness of nonbelief, the fact that many people inculpably fail to find sufficient evidence for the existence of God constitutes evidence for atheism. Schellenberg argues that since a loving God would not withhold the benefits of belief, the lack of evidence for God’s existence is incompatible with divine love. I argue that Schellenberg has not successfully defended his argument’s two controversial premises, that God’s love is incompatible with his allowing some to remain (...) in doubt that he exists, and that the nonbelief of some agnostics is inculpable. From the standpoint of what Christians believe about God, there are plausible reasons, which Schellenberg has not succeeded in refuting, for thinking that all nonbelief is culpable. I argue also that a loving God could have reasons remaining hidden to some persons, which are consistent with his desire to draw all people to faith. (shrink)

An exploration of the scientific mindset—such character virtues as curiosity, veracity, attentiveness, and humility to evidence—and its importance for science, democracy, and human flourishing. Exemplary scientists have a characteristic way of viewing the world and their work: their mindset and methods all aim at discovering truths about nature. In An Instinct for Truth, Robert Pennock explores this scientific mindset and argues that what Charles Darwin called “an instinct for truth, knowledge, and discovery” has a tacit moral structure—that it is (...) important not only for scientific excellence and integrity but also for democracy and human flourishing. In an era of “post-truth,” the scientific drive to discover empirical truths has a special value. Taking a virtue-theoretic perspective, Pennock explores curiosity, veracity, skepticism, humility to evidence, and other scientific virtues and vices. He explains that curiosity is the most distinctive element of the scientific character, by which other norms are shaped; discusses the passionate nature of scientific attentiveness; and calls for science education not only to teach scientific findings and methods but also to nurture the scientific mindset and its core values. Drawing on historical sources as well as a sociological study of more than a thousand scientists, Pennock's philosophical account is grounded in values that scientists themselves recognize they should aspire to. Pennock argues that epistemic and ethical values are normatively interconnected, and that for science and society to flourish, we need not just a philosophy of science, but a philosophy of the scientist. (shrink)

That Intelligent Design Creationism rejects the methodological naturalism of modern science in favor of a premodern supernaturalist worldview is well documented and by now well known. An irony that has not been sufficiently appreciated, however, is the way that ID Creationists try to advance their premodern view by adopting (if only tactically) a radical postmodern perspective. This paper will reveal the deep threads of postmodernism that run through the ID Creationist movement’s arguments, as evidenced in the writings and interviews of (...) its key leaders. Seeing their arguments and activities from this perspective highlights the danger to science posed by both ID Creationism and radical postmodernism. (shrink)

In the article, I demonstrate how realistic philosophy of religion can be employed in order to obtain a preliminary verification of the truthfulness of the doctrine proclaimed by a particular religious community. The first element of a religious doctrine that qualifies for philosophical evaluation is its non-contradictory character. For this reason I endeavour to reconstruct one such doctrine and show how it is possible to demonstrate, through philosophical analyses, that such a doctrine does not meet the aforementioned criterion. For the (...) object of my studies I chose the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (called the Mormon Church for short), as I find it particularly interesting among the religious movements alternative to Christianity. Among new religious movements currently in existence the Mormon Church stands out in several respects. First, this religious community utilises a variety of sources of revelation. Furthermore, although their sacred story, that spanning a dozen or so centuries, begins in Israel it mostly takes place on American soil. Finally, the Mormon Church sets forth a vision of a future ‘holy land,’ and the concept of salvation that is essentially different from those of other Bible-based religious movements. The Mormon concept of salvation, referred to as the plan of eternal progress shows both unique goal and unique means to achieve it. People are to become gods and populate multiple worlds. According to Mormons there will be different levels of salvation associated with what life a person lived on earth. Reconstruction and philosophical analysis of the main elements of the Mormon doctrine shows its weak points, inconsistencies, and oversimplifications. From this perspective, the Mormon ‘sacred story’ hardly could be regarded as something more than a colourful and interesting myth. But the question of reasons why Mormons still put their faith in such an inconsistent doctrine lies outside the scope of these considerations. (shrink)

I consider what it might mean to teach creationism and offer a variety of educational, legal, religious, and philosophical arguments for why it is improper to teach it in public school science classes and possibly elsewhere as well. I rebut the standard creationist arguments for inclusion. I also rebut Rawlsian arguments offered by philosopher of religion Alvin Plantinga.

This essay explores the dialectics of theory and practice in terms of argumentation theory. Adapting Jonsen and Toulmin's (1988) notion of a Theory-Practice spectrum, it conceives Theory and Practice as extreme ends of a continuum and discourses as falling at various points along the continuum. Every theoritical discourse has essential practical aspects, and every practical discourse has essential theoretical aspects. Practices are theorized to varying degrees but every practice is thorized to some degree. Reflective discourse, which is discourse about practice, (...) moves to and fro along the Theory-Practice continuum. Reflective discourse involves argumentation. Practical argumentation connects theory to practice; it appeals to general warrants, which may be simple or may tap into elaborate conceptual structures, in order to establish grounds for practical judgments. A practical discipline is a relatively coherent intellectual-professional enterprise that cultivates a field of social practice by engaging within itself and with practitioners in a reflective discourse. The argumentation of a practical discipline, like ordinary practical reflection, moves to and fro along the Theory-Practice continuum but in more methodical steps informed by systematic methodological reflection on the reflective process itself. (shrink)

In his keynote address at a recent Intelligent Design (ID) conference at Biola University, ID leader William Dembski began by quoting "a well-known ID sympathizer" whom he had asked to assess the current state of the ID movement. Dembski explained that he had asked because, "after some initial enthusiasm on his part three years ago, his interest seemed to have flagged" (Dembski 2002). The sympathizer replied that..

Key Words creation science, evolution education s Abstract Creationism, the rejection of evolution in favor of supernatural design, comes in many varieties besides the common young-earth Genesis version. Creationist attacks on science education have been evolving in the last few years through the alliance of different varieties. Instead of calls to teach “creation science,” one now finds lobbying for “intelligent design” (ID). Guided by the Discovery Institute’s “Wedge strategy,” the ID movement aims to overturn evolution and what it sees as (...) a pernicious materialist worldview and to renew a theistic foundation to Western culture, in which human beings are recognized as being created in the image of God. Common ID arguments involving scientific naturalism, “irreducible complexity,” “complex specified information,” and “icons of evolution,” have been thoroughly examined and refuted. Nevertheless, from Kansas to Ohio to the U.S. Congress, ID continues lobbying to teach the controversy, and scientists need to be ready to defend good evolution education. (shrink)

Some philosophers suggest that the development of scientificknowledge is a kind of Darwinian process. The process of discovery,however, is one problematic element of this analogy. I compare HerbertSimon's attempt to simulate scientific discovery in a computer programto recent connectionist models that were not designed for that purpose,but which provide useful cases to help evaluate this aspect of theanalogy. In contrast to the classic A.I. approach Simon used, ``neuralnetworks'' contain no explicit protocols, but are generic learningsystems built on the model of (...) the interconnections of neurons in thebrain. I describe two cases that take the connectionist approach a stepfurther by using genetic algorithms, a form of evolutionary computationthat explicitly models Darwinian mechanisms. These cases show thatDarwinian mechanisms can make novel discoveries of complex, previouslyunknown patterns. With some caveats, they lend support to evolutionaryepistemology. (shrink)

Recent work on extended mind theory has considered whether the material realizers of phenomenally conscious states might be distributed across both body and world. A popular framework for understanding perceptual consciousness in world-involving terms is sensorimotor enactivism, which holds that subjects make direct sensory contact with objects by means of their active, exploratory skills. In this paper, I consider the case of emotional experience, and argue that although the enactivist view does not transfer neatly to this domain, there are elements (...) of emotional consciousness whose physical underpinnings include parts of the extra-bodily environment. (shrink)

_The Concept of Analytic Contact_ presents practitioners with new ways to assist the often severely disturbed patients that come to see them in both private and institutional settings. In this book Robert Waska outlines the use of psychoanalysis as a method of engagement that can be utilised with or without the addition of multiple weekly visits and the analytic couch. The chapters in this book follow a wide spectrum of cases and clinical situations where hard to reach patients are (...) provided with the best opportunity for health and healing through the establishment of analytic contact. Divided into four parts, this book covers: the concept of analytic contact caution and reluctance concerning psychological engagement drugs, mutilation, and psychic fragmentation clinical reality, psychoanalysis and the utility of analytic contact. Analytic contact is demonstrated to be a valuable clinical approach to working analytically with a complicated group of patients in a successful manner. It will be of great interest to all practitioners in the field of psychoanalysis and psychotherapy. (shrink)

Confusing clinical standoffs, loyalty to self-destruction and abrupt terminations are challenging and under-examined problems for the modern psychoanalytic practitioner. _The Danger of Change_ is a timely book that addresses the so-called resistant patient so many clinicians are familiar with. Robert Waska blends theory based on Melanie Klein’s classical stance with the more contemporary Freudian/Kleinian school, to demonstrate how to understand patients that are resistant to progress. Divided into four sections, this book covers: reluctant patients and the fight against change: (...) caught between the paranoid and depressive world greed and the dangers of change interruptions to the process of change: loss, envy, and the death instinct working toward change in the face of overwhelming odds Extensive and detailed clinical material is used to bring clarity to subjects including symbolism, conflict resolution, projective identification, the depressive and paranoid positions, change and trust. _The Danger of Change_ brings hope and clarity to cases involving patients who experience progress as a threat to their emotional wellbeing. It will be of great interest to all practising psychoanalysts, as well as those studying psychoanalytic theory and practice. (shrink)

This title is part of UC Press's Voices Revived program, which commemorates University of California Press’s mission to seek out and cultivate the brightest minds and give them voice, reach, and impact. Drawing on a backlist dating to 1893, Voices Revived makes high-quality, peer-reviewed scholarship accessible once again using print-on-demand technology. This title was originally published in 1955.

Teach the Controversy? Kansas just can't get a break. In 1999, the state became an international laughingstock when creationists on the State Board of Education, led by Steve Abrams, gutted what would have been a model science curriculum, removing the theme of evolution as well as mentions of the Big Bang and the geological timescale (Pennock, 1999b, 2000). These board members and the creationist groups that assisted them seemed to confirm every stereotype of Kansas as an ignorant backwater. The creationists (...) lost their majority on the Board in the next election when sensible I~sans made their voices heard, and the standat'ds were righted. But freedom — in this case, freedom from the tyranny of ignorance— demands eternal vigilance, and science defenders were too quick to test on theit laurels. Another election passed and in 2005 Steve Abrams and his allies. were at.. (shrink)

Bill Poteat was a member of Duke University’s Department of Religion and served a term as Chairman, during which I served with him as Director of Undergraduate Studies. I knew him as a brilliant scholar who devoted his exceptional gifts primarily to his teaching and his students. He was charming, gracious, yet we his Duke professorial colleagues never really knew him. One of our ranks suggested that the idea of Bill as a colleague was an oxymoron. Bill did not attend (...) professional meetings and only rarely had conversation of any sort with colleagues. He lived in Chapel Hill and not Durham. However, he seemed not to be at home in any of his academies-UNC Philosophy Department, Duke Divinity School, or finally the Duke Department of Religion. It was not clear what his commitments were. I knew that he had a Christian heritage and perhaps a Christian “hangover,” and had a Divinity degree from Yale. Nevertheless, his personal faith was not publically expressed. Perhaps it found expression in his zealous efforts to overcome the Cartesianism of the modern mind which he contended was inimical to the Christian understanding of the human person and his/her relationship to God. Yet, he was restless, rarely present to us and perhaps also to himself. (shrink)

Bill Poteat was a member of Duke University’s Department of Religion and served a term as Chairman, during which I served with him as Director of Undergraduate Studies. I knew him as a brilliant scholar who devoted his exceptional gifts primarily to his teaching and his students. He was charming, gracious, yet we his Duke professorial colleagues never really knew him. One of our ranks suggested that the idea of Bill as a colleague was an oxymoron. Bill did not attend (...) professional meetings and only rarely had conversation of any sort with colleagues. He lived in Chapel Hill and not Durham. However, he seemed not to be at home in any of his academies-UNC Philosophy Department, Duke Divinity School, or finally the Duke Department of Religion. It was not clear what his commitments were. I knew that he had a Christian heritage and perhaps a Christian “hangover,” and had a Divinity degree from Yale. Nevertheless, his personal faith was not publically expressed. Perhaps it found expression in his zealous efforts to overcome the Cartesianism of the modern mind which he contended was inimical to the Christian understanding of the human person and his/her relationship to God. Yet, he was restless, rarely present to us and perhaps also to himself. (shrink)

Bill Poteat was a member of Duke University’s Department of Religion and served a term as Chairman, during which I served with him as Director of Undergraduate Studies. I knew him as a brilliant scholar who devoted his exceptional gifts primarily to his teaching and his students. He was charming, gracious, yet we his Duke professorial colleagues never really knew him. One of our ranks suggested that the idea of Bill as a colleague was an oxymoron. Bill did not attend (...) professional meetings and only rarely had conversation of any sort with colleagues. He lived in Chapel Hill and not Durham. However, he seemed not to be at home in any of his academies-UNC Philosophy Department, Duke Divinity School, or finally the Duke Department of Religion. It was not clear what his commitments were. I knew that he had a Christian heritage and perhaps a Christian “hangover,” and had a Divinity degree from Yale. Nevertheless, his personal faith was not publically expressed. Perhaps it found expression in his zealous efforts to overcome the Cartesianism of the modern mind which he contended was inimical to the Christian understanding of the human person and his/her relationship to God. Yet, he was restless, rarely present to us and perhaps also to himself. (shrink)

The confessing church forgot that Barth's interest in the integrity of the church was not an end in itself, but rather in the interest of the service of the church in and for the world.

Accession Number: ATLA0001712273; Hosting Book Page Citation: p 732-747.; Language(s): English; General Note: Bibliography: p 746-748.; Issued by ATLA: 20130825; Publication Type: Essay.

Socrates did not claim to know many things, but one of the things that he insisted he did know with certainty was that there is a genuine distinction between knowledge and true opinion. Socrates maintained that unless this distinction held, inquiry would be pointless. Such a claim would seem to pre-suppose knowledge of what it means to know, an ability to specify the ground of the distinction between knowledge and true opinion. However, the attempt to bring the manifold forms of (...) knowledge under a unified definition in the Theaetetus ends in perplexity. (shrink)

In a recent article in Faith and Philosophy, Wesley Morriston argues that Plantinga’s Free Will Defense is incompatible with his version of the ontological argument because the former requires that God be free in a sense that precludes a requirement of the latter---that God be morally perfect in all possible worlds. God’s perfection, according to Morriston, includes moral goodness, which requires that God be free in the sense that entails that in some possible worlds God performs wrong actions. I argue (...) that Morriston’sintention is based upon a faulty conception of both God’s perfection and His freedom. God’s perfection does not entail that He has moral obligations which in some possible worlds He fails to discharge, and His freely performing an action does not entail that there are possible worlds in which He does not perform it. (shrink)